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a b s t r a c t
We recently (Castellacci and Choi, 2013) formulated a theoretical framework for the modeling of ﬁnancial
instability contagion using the theories of dynamical systems. Here, our main goal is to model the Eurozone ﬁnancial crisis within that framework. The underlying system comprises many economic agents that
belong to several subsystems. In each instantiation of this framework, the hierarchy and nesting of
the subsystems is dictated by the nature of the problem at hand. We describe in great detail how a
suitable model can be set up for the Eurozone crisis. The dynamical system is deﬁned by the evolution
of the wealths of the individual agents and can be estimated by solving a nonlinear programming
problem that incorporates features of prospect theory. Contagion is formulated in terms of how the market instability indicators for the different subsystems and the global system behave. We present several
scenarios tailored to recent ﬁnancial developments in the Eurozone and discussed within our model.
These all point to the key role played by the elasticity coefﬁcients of the wealth dynamical system.
Accordingly, we put forward general recommendations on how regulators or other super-systemic agents
may act to prevent and forestall the spreading of ﬁnancial distress.
Ó 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Since the bursting of the NASDAQ bubble in the year 2000, the
global economy seems to have entered a regime of recurring instability. In the long-term alternation of risk aversion and risk appetite,
the hiatus between crises induces participants in the ﬁnancial
markets (and to a certain extent, any economic agent) to gradually
forget the lessons of previous crises and correspondingly indulge
in the illusion that This Time is Different (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).
In the early 2000s the widespread prudence that pervaded the
ﬁnancial markets in the wake of the crash of the equity bubble
and the spectacular collapse of major public corporations on both
sides of the Atlantic, quickly abated thanks to several powerful global trends and domestic ﬁscal and monetary policies. These kindled
a bubble in real estate in many developed and developing countries.
Such trend climaxed likely some time in early 2007. The weakest
links in the speculation chain that inﬂated the bubble in the US
were also the canary in the mine: subprime mortgage loans and
the securities they backed. The epitome of this bubble’s inﬂation
was likely the extreme leveraging attained through loss layers
(tranches) of structured investment vehicles (SIV) and especially

collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) comprising asset-backed
securities (ABS), whose ‘‘compound tranching’’ structure led to a
dramatic perception of low risk, as sanctioned by all rating agencies, in the senior tranches. When the brewing crisis ﬁnally erupted
in September 2008, ﬁnancial markets were confronted with
systemic uncertainty as to both the size and the complexity of such
asset and the role they played in the balance sheet of major
institutions.1 This time, the same generation of market participants
that had experienced the last crisis was still investing into and
managing ﬁnancial assets. For many years, the markets had trusted
the framework and agencies government had put in place in the wake
of major crises (such as the Federal Reserve in the US) with their ability to protect the value of mainstream assets with ‘‘puts.’’ The panics
of the XIX century appeared consigned to history. As the fall of 2008
approached this sense of security seemed itself a thing of the past.
The ensuing crisis induced the US Federal Reserve (the Fed) in
conjunction with the Treasury to implement extreme measures,
some of which required legislation. This set in motion a new phase
of the crisis: governments began absorbing private debt in unprecedented fashion. In 2009, the ﬁnancial markets hailed such sweeping action as the only way in which a ﬂoor could be put under the
insolvency of major banks. Panic abated, and ﬁnancial assets
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Anecdotal reporting revealed that even the size of the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) was determined rather haphazardly by the Treasury secretary.
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rebounded, but as it turned out this was a Pyrrhic victory. The bulk
of the risk had simply been shifted. Emblematic in this regard was
the decision of the Irish government to bail out the country’s major
bank thereby taming the national debt unmanageable.
Credit risk aversion reared its head when, in early 2010, it
became apparent that the ﬁscal conditions of the peripheral economies2 in the European Monetary Union (EMU, a.k.a. Eurozone),
were much more precarious than previously perceived. The economic history of these countries is different, and correspondingly
diverse is the way in which they led their national balance sheet into
a danger zone. Common became the perception that the sovereign
debt of these countries is unmanageable and default was increasingly likely. Furthermore, while the debt of smaller peripheral economies (Greece, Portugal, and Ireland) was deemed salvageable,
Italian public debt is way beyond the arsenal of bail out funds available to the ECB and other monetary institutions.
Why did international credit market focus on the Eurozone problems? Arguably, the main reason is that the monetary union does
not correspond to any systemic ﬁscal institution, unlike conventional nation states (e.g., the Fed and the Treasury in the US). Therefore individual countries have a very indirect and weak control of
monetary policy while still responsible for their economies. And
even the ECB is heavily constrained in managing the money supply
in its mandate. At the same time, regulation on risk capital encouraged investing in sovereign debt by considering it virtually riskless
regardless of issuance. Banks and other institutions chased the
higher yields of PIIGS’ debt thereby accumulating unprecedented
leverage.3 After spreading from Greece to the other small peripheral
economies (Portugal and Ireland), in the fall of 2011 ‘‘contagion’’4
pushed Italian 10-year yields above the threshold of sustainability
of 7%. The emergency lending implemented by the ECB stanched
the liquidity hemorrhage. However, just as in the spring of 2009
within the US banking system, this is much more an issue of solvency.
At the same time, austerity alone is unlikely to allow debtor nations to
satisfy their creditors. Greece, which has endured the longest
recession in economic history, is most emblematic in this regard.
Dynamical systems is a relatively new ﬁeld of mathematics that
studies the evolution of time-dependent systems. Regardless of the
system under consideration, the predominant goal of the ﬁeld is to
investigate the stability of the state at a given time and its asymptotic behavior, which is often realized by studying the trajectory of
a point in the system. Although the laws, physical or otherwise,
that govern the system remain unaltered over time, the dynamical
system (e.g. function or vector ﬁelds on the system) itself can be
perturbed to yield a dynamic behavior that is totally different from
the original one. This is why we believe that the theory of dynamical systems can be fruitfully applied to the modeling of ﬁnancial
crises, not only the 2007–09+ US subprime crisis and the Eurozone
sovereign credit crisis but also general ones, from the analysis of
the etiology and containment to prevention.
Indeed, the second author already carried out such research in
the case of one economic system (Choi and Douady, 2012). Choi
and Douady used multi-agent dynamical systems to model, ﬁrst
the 2007–09+ US ﬁnancial crisis, then ﬁnancial crises in a single
economy in general. An economic system is divided into aggregates called ‘‘agent,’’ and a dynamical system is constructed to
track the wealth of the agents. High leverage and borrowing capacity constraints of the agents induce a bifurcation and subsequent
change of the stability type of economic equilibria. Near an unstable equilibrium, a negative shock on wealth can propagate through
the system via the feedback loop created by inter-agent cash ﬂows,
2

The so-called PIIGS, namely Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain.
There are reports of leverage ratios exceeding 400.
4
Here we are employing the common language sense of this word and not the
quantitative deﬁnition we will be applying later in the article.
3
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and due to the nonlinearity of the system, the shock can intensify
while propagating, incurring wealth drops of all affected agents. If
among the affected agents are banks, due to the interconnected of
the banking system and extremely high leverage from the esoteric
ﬁnancial tools widely used these days, not only their wealth would
drop with acceleration but also would follow bank runs and mass
bankruptcies. The entire economy would be severely hit and very
likely a ﬁnancial crisis would emerge. The incorporation of bifurcation mechanism and theories on stability to explain ﬁnancial crises
is the major difference between Choi and Douady (2012) and other
multi-agent based models.
In order to apply such ideas to the Eurozone sovereign debt
crisis, we deemed it necessary to extend that framework to the
case of multiple economies as part of a global economic system,
and this is the major accomplishment of Castellacci and Choi
(2013), the prequel of this article. While Castellacci and Choi
(2013) studies ﬁnancial crises and contagion in a multi-economy
system in general, our focus in this article is its application to the
Eurozone. Besides, we incorporate prospect theory by Kahneman
and Tversky to explain agents’ psychology in decision making that
directly affects the ﬂow of funds in the system.
The construction of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 is introduced that a structured global economy comprises many agents
that are members of different subsystems as well as of the global
system. Furthermore, we extend the construction of wealth
dynamical systems via a nonlinear programming problem (NLP)
by integrating concepts from Prospect Theory that reﬂect changing
risk appetites. Then in Section 3, which is the core of the paper, we
further motivate the notion of instability contagion that we have
recently introduced (Castellacci and Choi, 2013). This is illustrated
with and applied to scenarios that reﬂect recent developments in
the Eurozone crisis. These give us the opportunity not only to analyze the mechanism of contagion, but also to put forth suggestions
on how governments and independent, possibly super-national
authorities may intervene to preempt or forestal the spreading of
ﬁnancial distress. Appendices recall and extend the framework ﬁrst
laid out in Choi and Douady (2012) and Castellacci and Choi
(2013)) to adapt it to the problems at hand. The ﬁrst author would
like to thank Fedor A. Bogomolov and the Courant Institute of
Mathematical Sciences for their kind support.
2. The dynamical system of wealth
We will follow the work of Choi and Douady (2012) in building
a dynamical system of wealth. We assume that an economy is
structured as a system of n agents, and a time-dependent deterministic dynamical system for the scaled (converted in constant
base currency – the euro in our case) wealth vector
wðtÞ ¼ ðw1 ðtÞ; . . . ; wn ðtÞÞ 2 Rn is constructed, where wi ðtÞ is the
wealth of agent i at time t. Then we extend this framework to more
than one economy in the spirit of Castellacci and Choi (2013). We
will leave the details to Appendixes A.1, A.2, and A.2, and in this
section, focus on inter-agent cash ﬂows and agents’ investment
decision making.
2.1. Economic agents and global wealth
According to the framework put forward in Castellacci and Choi
(2013), we consider a global economic system that consists of s
subeconomies. To reﬂect the Eurozone structure, we assume that
each subeconomy is sovereign and ﬁscally independent, and the
global economy is a monetary union with super-national monetary
authorities (MA). As in Choi and Douady (2012), we represent each
subeconomy by ﬁve agents (economic aggregates): consumers,
ﬁrms, banks, government, and investors. Following Castellacci
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Fig. 1. Cash ﬂows between subeconomies i and j. The dotted lines are domestic cash
ﬂows, the solid lines international ones.

Fig. 2. A typical value function from prospect theory.

Weighting W (p)

and Choi (2013) we use an upper index to denote the subeconomy,
thus the ﬁve agents in subeconomy i are Ci, Fi, Bi, Gi, and Ii.5 The
cash ﬂows between agents, which drive the market and determine
the global wealth, are broadly classiﬁed into four groups: at-will,
scheduled, contingent, and international. Tables 1–4 summarize typical ones (more details can be found in Castellacci and Choi (2013)).
When considering international cash ﬂows, we classify the
nationality of ﬁrms and banks by their physical location, hence a
multinational company can belong to several countries. As such,
trades or fund transfers between its headquarter and local
branches are considered as international cash ﬂows. Lending at private level, regardless of the nationality of the lending banks, is considered as a domestic cash ﬂows for the same reason. However we
assume direct transactions between governments and banks,
hence consider investment in foreign sovereign bonds as international cash ﬂows as schematized in Fig. 1.

Probability p
Fig. 3. A typical weighting function that distorts probability p.

Z

E½UðXÞ ¼

UðxÞ dFðxÞ

ð1Þ

R

2.2. Optimal investment and ﬁnancial crisis
An economically cogent technique to construct a wealth
dynamical system is to require that each agent optimizes the utility of its investment in all other agents in the system. This problem
can be solved constructively using a nonlinear programming problem (NLP), which we proceed to expose.
We choose an optimal cash ﬂow F ji from i to j that optimizes
some utility of i of receiving F ij ðsÞ for all s > t subject to liquidity
and solvency constraints. In doing so, we reﬁne Choi and Douady
(2012) approach with regards to the class of agent utility functions,
which is based on the Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979),Tversky and Kahneman (1992). In this theoretical framework, classical utility (Friedman and Savage, 1948) is replaced by
a value function U : ½a; b!R where a < 0 < b, along with a weighting function (cf. Weber (1994)). The value function UðxÞ is increasing, convex for losses, and concave for gains, namely, U 0 ðxÞ > 0,
U 00 ðxÞ P 0 for x < 0, and U 00 ðxÞ 6 0 for x > 0 (see Fig. 2). The weighting function W reﬂects the investor’s attitude toward risk, and it is
R
possible that R W 0 ðFðxÞÞ dFðxÞ > 1. In our case, we use separate
weighting functions, W  for loss and W þ for gain, (deﬁned over
intervals containing ½a; 0Þ and ð0; b, respectively) each of which
looks like the one in Fig. 3, and write W ¼ 1½a;0Þ W  þ 1ð0;b W þ .6
Expectations are taken with respect to a probability measure P,
which deﬁnes a cumulative distribution function (CDF)
FðxÞ :¼ P½X 6 x for each random variable X. Then expected utility
can be written as
5
This agent represent international portfolio managers who manage assets of
agents in subeconomy i.
6
1A denotes the indicator function of a set. Note that since this function will be
used only as part of integrands, the fact that it not deﬁned at x ¼ 0 is not problematic.
Ditto for its derivative.

and the subjective utility (SU, deﬁned in Rieger and Wang (2006) as
a generalization of Tversky and Kahneman (1992)) is

SU½X ¼

Z

0

UðxÞ

1

¼

Z

d 
W ðFðxÞÞdx þ
dx

Z

1

UðxÞ

0

d þ
W ðFðxÞÞdx
dx

UðxÞ W 0 ðFðxÞÞ dFðxÞ

ð2Þ
ð3Þ

R

We apply and slightly extend prospect theory to suit our needs as
follows. Each agent i is endowed with a value function satisfying
the above properties. We assume that the probability measure
can vary with time, but at each time t the probability measure Pt
is common to all agents.7 On the other hand, we assign a possibly
different weighting function W i;t ðxÞ to each agent. Thus, value functions reﬂect the same ordered preferences in time while the probability measures and weighting functions can model the evolution of
the agents’ risk appetites. Then, the subjective utility for i during
½t; t þ 1Þ is deﬁned as

SUi;t ½X ¼

Z

0

U i ðxÞ

1



d 
W ðF t ðxÞÞdx þ
dx i;t

Z

1

U i ðxÞ

0

d þ
W ðF t ðxÞÞdx
dx i;t

ð4Þ

where F t is the CDF of X deﬁned by Pt .8
7
The reader concerned with the formalism of stochastics, may wish to think of this
family of probability measures as part of stochastic base satisfying the usual
conditions. In particular the ﬁltration of r-algebras is increasing so as to model the
accretion of information.
8
Notice that these random variables X will be taken to be fund ﬂows between
agents at time t; F ji ðtÞ. Thus, the initially stochastic ﬂows give rise to a deterministic
dynamical system via expectation. Incidentally, the notation for the CDF has nothing
to do with that for the cash ﬂows.
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For an investment F ji ðtÞ by i, we discount its future returns F ij ðsÞ
by a discount factor Dðt; sÞ9 and sum over a ﬁnite number of ‘‘resets’’
within the ﬁnite horizon ðt; T to get the net present value (NPV) of
P
the investment, t<sl 6T Dðt; sl ÞF ij ðsl Þ  F ji ðtÞ. The net subjective utility
(NSU) of the agent i for the investment F ji ðtÞ is thus:

"
NSUi;t ðF ji ðtÞÞ ¼ SUi;t

X

#
Dðt; sl ÞF ij ðsl Þ  F ji ðtÞ

ð5Þ

t<sl 6T

The optimal F ij s are found by solving a system of NLP:

NLP :

max

zi ¼

n
X

NSUi;t ðF ji ðtÞÞ

ð6Þ

j¼1

subject to

Li ðtÞ P 0
e K i ðt þ 1Þj 6 ji ðt þ 1ÞK i ðtÞ
jD
e
D Di ðt þ 1Þ 6 Di max ðt þ 1Þ  ð1 þ r i ðtÞÞDi ðtÞ

ð7Þ
ð8Þ
ð9Þ

1 6 i 6 n; t P 0:
The origin of time t ¼ 0 is the beginning of the economic period
under consideration. Each agent chooses an optimal
F ji ðtÞ; 1 6 i; j 6 n from the NLP (6) for each t, and optimally select
its debt level Di ðt þ 1Þ (within borrowing capacity limits) and allocates its new wealth wi ðt þ 1Þ between Li ðt þ 1Þ and K i ðt þ 1Þ.
Details on the constraints can be found in Appendix A.1.
This system of NLP is an n-player coordination game with
mixed strategy, cf. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). It is a
coordination game because each agent is well-informed on its
investment conditions, ample macroeconomic information is publicly available, and they are happy to collaborate with one another
to maximize their wealths. It is a mixed strategy game since
changes in constraints result in different optimal solutions. As
such, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists (Strafﬁn, 1993).10
Once we ﬁnd an optimal solution, a wealth dynamical system f can
be constructed as in Choi and Douady (2012). This f is a predictable
process, which, if there is no exogenous random inﬂuence on the
system, becomes deterministic. Choi and Douady (2012) explains
how Predictable process can be treated like a deterministic map in
terms of equilibria and stability, so without loss of generality, we
will assume our dynamical system f is deterministic.
3. Contagion in the Eurozone crisis
3.1. Origin of ﬁnancial crises in this modeling framework
The modeling framework introduced in Choi and Douady (2012)
connects all economic agents in a single economy with cash ﬂows,
and if the borrowing capacity of an agent is reduced while its leverage is already high, then a ‘‘default’’11 is inevitable. Furthermore,
when the default is too sizable, or other agents are exceedingly leveraged with respect to the defaulting cash ﬂows, the ensuing shock
spreads through the economic system, causing systemic risk and
possibly a ﬁnancial crisis. The authors suggested that policy makers
monitor the market instability indicator (Appendix A.3) especially as
it crosses certain judiciously preset thresholds and intervene proactively, for instance, by deleveraging the market through close control
9

This can be thought of as the price of a zero coupon bond at t which delivers $1 at

403

of the elasticity coefﬁcients (Appendix A.2). This can be attained by
identifying the amount of liquidities to inject in each economic segment, using in each case the appropriate means, such as quantitative
easing for banks, tax credits for investors and corporations, investment and expense programs for corporations, recovery of consumption for consumers, etc. However the authors’ recommendation
apply to a single economy with the assumption that the government
has the means to implement such policies, if necessary by increasing
the money supply. In the case of the sovereign crisis in the Eurozone,
governments who don’t have sovereign monetary authority are at
greater risk of default, so their model does not apply as is.
The fears for a sovereign credit crisis in the Eurozone started
developing in late 2009. In the next two years the crisis became
reality, having resulted in bailouts of three countries, Greece
(twice), Ireland, and Portugal. Nevertheless the situation worsened
and the sovereign credit risk spread to Spain12 and Italy, with the
yields on their government bonds rising sharply. This prompted
the European Central Bank (ECB) to purchase Spanish and Italian
bonds to bring the yield down. On October 26, 2011, European leaders agreed on a deal that reduces the existing Greek debt, in which
private investors take ‘‘voluntary’’ haircut of 50% (BBC timeline).
On the news European stock markets soared (MarketWatch, 2011)
and the crisis seemed to be contained without further contagion.
The rally did not last long, and during the month following the Greek
debt restructuring agreement, bank stocks in Europe and in the US
dropped sharply (Yahoo! Finance) while the borrowing cost of the
Eurozone countries rose to dangerous levels (Trading Economics),
and the fear for ‘‘contagion’’ has emerged.
3.2. Deﬁning contagion
But what is this ‘‘contagion?’’ In the economic context, this intuitively suggests spreading of asset price crash (burst of bubbles) in
time and space. To mathematically deﬁne this concept, immediate
questions one may ask (cf. Karolyi, 2003) are:
(a) How does one detect a crisis in an economic system?
(b) How does one determine causation between one crisis and
another? Is succession in time sufﬁcient?
To answer these questions, Castellacci and Choi (2013) recently
gave quantitative deﬁnition of ﬁnancial instability contagion.
Deﬁnition 3.1. (Instability Contagion). Consider a (global) economic system comprising s subsystems. Let BðtÞ be the Jacobian
matrix of the global system at time t (cf. Eq. (38)) and BðkÞ ðtÞ the
corresponding matrix for the k-th subsystem.13 We say that
(instability) contagion occurs if given two time instants t 0 ; t 1 with
0 < t 0 < t 1 14 the market instability indicators of the global system,
qðBðÞÞ, and of the subsystems, qðBðkÞ ðÞÞ, satisfy the following
properties
(i) At time t < t0 ,

maxqðBðkÞ ðtÞÞ < 1 and qðBðtÞÞ < 1
16k6s

ð10Þ

(ii) At time t 2 ðt 0 ; t 1 Þ,

maxqðBðkÞ ðtÞÞ > 1 and qðBðtÞÞ < 1
16k6s

ð11Þ

s.
10
In theory there are inﬁnitely many optimal solutions due to the random
constraints, but in reality, there are limited range of macroeconomic choices, and after
rounding to common currency unit, such as billions of dollars, we can make the
number of strategies ﬁnite.
11
Choi and Douady (2012) deﬁned ‘‘default’’ such that an agent i at a given time t is
in default if it has no choice but violating its borrowing capacity constraint, i.e. it
cannot meet its obligation because of borrowing capacity constraint. As a result, cash
ﬂows originating from agent i abruptly decrease.

12
At the time of writing, Spain called for a bailout for its banks (The Financial Times,
2012). That of the government itself is likely to follow.
13
For the relationships between these matrices, cf. Appendix A.2 as well as
Castellacci and Choi (2013). Notice also that q denotes the spectral radius of a matrix
consistently with Appendix A.3.
14
We assume the origin of time in our model is 0.
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(iii) At time t > t1

BðtÞ–sk¼1 BðkÞ ðtÞ

and qðBðtÞÞ > 1:

ð12Þ





t þ 3=2

1=2

1=2

t=2 þ 1=2



t

0

0

t=2

ð13Þ


for t 2 ½0; 2;

ð14Þ

qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ



2
trðBðtÞÞ  trðBðtÞÞ  4jBðtÞj

qðBðtÞÞ ¼ max 

2


qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ


2  3t2  t 4t þ t
¼
:
2
t 2 ½0; 1Þ maxk qðBðkÞ ðtÞÞ < 1

while

ð15Þ
for

t 2 ð1; 2 maxk

ðkÞ

qðB ðtÞÞ > 1. On the other hand qðBðtÞÞ has a more
interesting

pﬃﬃﬃﬃ
behavior. For t 2 ½0; 1=8Þ, qðBðtÞÞ > 1. For t 2 1=8; 134 41 ;
qðBðtÞÞ < 1. Finally, t 2



pﬃﬃﬃﬃ
13 41
;2
4

; qðBðtÞÞ > 1. This can be inter-

preted as there being initial systemic instability while the component economies are stable. The global instability abates and the
system becomes stable after t ¼ 1=8. Both component economies
experience linearly declining wealth. Then the ﬁrst economy enters
a period of instability t 2 ð1; 2Þ. This gradually spills over the entire
pﬃﬃﬃﬃ
system, which eventually becomes unstable after 134 41. We depict
this behavior in Fig. 4.
3.3. Case studies
Here we illustrate the economic mechanism of contagion
(Castellacci and Choi, 2013) with scenarios that pertain to the
ongoing Eurozone crisis. Since contagion is deﬁned via the market
instability indicator (see Appendix A.3 for details), a lower bound
thereof provides a sufﬁcient condition for a contagion of instability.
To this end, recall that the trace of a square matrix M is the sum of
its eigenvalues:

trðMÞ ¼

n
X
ki ;

ð16Þ

1
0.8
0.6

0.2
0

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1
t

1.2

1.4

jtrðMÞj
6 max jki j ¼: qðMÞ;
ki 2rðMÞ
n

ð17Þ

where rðMÞ :¼ fk1 ; . . . ; kn g is the matrix spectrum. Applying this to
Eq. (54), we get the following lower bound of the market instability
indicator IðtÞ ¼ qðBðtÞÞ,
Notice the BðiÞ ðtÞði ¼ 1; 2Þ are scalar (1-dimensional block matrices).

1.6

1.8

2

Fig. 4. The spectral radius of a one-parameter family of Jacobian matrices, which is
consistent with (53).

ð18Þ

The mechanism of different types of contagion is analyzed in
Castellacci and Choi (2013). We apply two of them, cross-border
contagion from default and cross-border contagion from fear factor,
to the sovereign crisis in the Eurozone to explore the scenarios in
which the crisis can evolve. Although this study is based on a purely
mathematical model, it may become useful in establishing the possible outcomes of the current situation and build appropriate strategies for each case.
When a ‘‘contagion’’ takes place, the spread of the instability
starts within a subset of the global economy and develops in
stages, hence we do not need to consider all the subeconomies in
the monetary union all at once. Therefore, rather than modeling
all the 17 countries of the Eurozone, we will focus on a ‘‘mini
Eurozone’’ which consists of four countries which we consider
the core of the crisis: the two peripheral members, Greece and
Italy, and their two major creditors, France and Germany. The
peripheral economies have different sizes and economic backgrounds, yet both are susceptible to sovereign credit conditions;
the creditor countries, albeit being the 4th and the 5th in GDP size
of the world economy and main driving forces of the Eurozone,
have different current accounts and unemployment rates. We
index with the integers from 1 to 4 to Greece, Italy, France, and
Germany in that order, total 20 agents in the global economy
(the mini Eurozone). For each country we assign 1 to 5 for the ﬁve
agents, consumers (C), ﬁrms (F), banks (B), government (G), and
investors (I), in that order. We follow the notations and indexing
as we deﬁned in Section A.2. Then we have the following elasticity
matrix AðtÞ and Jacobian matrix BðtÞ:

0

Að1Þ ðtÞ

Að12Þ ðtÞ Að13Þ ðtÞ Að14Þ ðtÞ

1

C
B ð21Þ
B A ðtÞ Að2Þ ðtÞ Að23Þ ðtÞ Að24Þ ðtÞ C
C
AðtÞ ¼ B
C
B ð31Þ
ð32Þ
ð3Þ
ð34Þ
@ A ðtÞ A ðtÞ A ðtÞ A ðtÞ A

i¼1

which implies

15

1.2

 


 

1 X
n
n
1X
1X
 


bii  ¼ 1 þ
aii ðtÞ 
aij ðtÞ 6 qðBÞ:


n i¼1  
n i¼1
n i–j

so that maxk qðBðkÞ ðtÞÞ ¼ t, whereas

For

1.4

0.4

for t 2 ½0; 2:

Notice that in this case the scalar economies’ wealth decline linearly
for Bð1Þ ðtÞ ¼ ðtÞ and Bð2Þ ðtÞ ¼ ðt=2Þ so that

Bð1Þ ðtÞ  Bð2Þ ðtÞ ¼

1.6

ρ

Example 1. In this simple example, we illustrate the mere
mathematical aspects of our deﬁnition of contagion. Consider the
following one-parameter family of matrices that represent the
Jacobian matrix of a global system that consists of two mono-agent
subeconomies15

ρ(B(t))


maxk ρ(B (k) (t))

1.8

Notice that the last condition is to capture the causal nature
of contagion. Indeed, if BðtÞ ¼ sk¼1 BðkÞ ðtÞ, then qðBðtÞÞ ¼ maxk
qðBðkÞ ðtÞÞ, which means a global crisis could arise from the
independent occurrence of sub-systemic crises.

BðtÞ ¼

Spectral radius of B(t) as function of parameter t

2

Að41Þ ðtÞ Að42Þ ðtÞ Að43Þ ðtÞ

Að4Þ ðtÞ


where AðkÞ ðtÞ ¼ akij ðtÞ 1 6 i 6 5 is the elasticity matrix of subecon16j65

omy k, and AðklÞ ðtÞ ¼ akl
ij ðtÞ 1 6 i 6 5 ,
16j65
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0

1

Bð1Þ ðtÞ Að21Þ ðtÞ Að31Þ ðtÞ Að41Þ ðtÞ
B ð21Þ
C
B A ðtÞ Bð2Þ ðtÞ Að61Þ ðtÞ Að61Þ ðtÞ C
C
BðtÞ ¼ B
B ð31Þ
C
ð32Þ
ð34Þ
@ A ðtÞ A ðtÞ Bð3Þ ðtÞ A ðtÞ A
Að41Þ ðtÞ Að42Þ ðtÞ Að43Þ ðtÞ

Bð4Þ ðtÞ


k
where BðkÞ ðtÞ ¼ bij ðtÞ 1 6 i 6 5 is the Jacobian matrix of subecon16j65
omy k. We call AðkÞ ðtÞ and BðkÞ ðtÞ local matrices, and AðtÞ and BðtÞ
global ones. We proceed to formulate the recent history of the
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis in terms of our model. This will
provide both a description of these events and policy
recommendations.16
As is well known this originated in Greece, which correspond to
the subeconomy i ¼ 1. Eurozone political and monetary authorities, having acknowledged Greek ﬁnancial turmoil, have enacted
a number of measures aimed at cordoning off that instability and
forestall contagion. In terms of the elasticity matrix AðtÞ, contagion
is prevented if the entries in the block Ai1 ðtÞ are small enough to
keep qðBðtÞÞ < 1 for all t17. The most drastic such measure was an
agreement with private bondholder that resulted in a writedown
over 50% and the debt swaps between the Greek government and
private debt holders in March 2012 (Riskdata, 2012; Wikipedia).
Despite such efforts, the market widely speculated the ‘‘Grexit,’’
the Greek exit of the Eurozone, while Spain, a much bigger economy
in the zone, struggled with bank bailouts (The Financial Times,
2012), a newly high cost of borrowing and credit rating downgrade
(The Financial Times, 2012). Rather than following what has happened, we will provide scenarios to show how our model can be
applied in each case. Therefore, the countries mentioned in the following scenarios can be replaced by any debtor and creditor countries in the Eurozone. In analyzing the contagion scenarios, we will
use the following results from Castellacci and Choi (2013) on the
behavior of the wealth dynamical system.
Result 1. The wealth wi ðtÞ of agent i at time t satisﬁes the following:
(a) If wi ðtÞ is strictly increasing or strictly decreasing in t, then
bii ðtÞ > 0.
(b) If wi ðtÞ is strictly increasing and convex, then bii ðtÞ > 1.
(c) If wi ðtÞ is strictly decreasing and concave, then bii ðtÞ > 1.

Result 2. For t0 < t 1 , the invested asset K i ðtÞ of agent i at time t satisﬁes the following:
(a) If K i ðtÞ is strictly increasing or strictly decreasing,
(b) If K i ðtÞ is strictly increasing and convex,

K 0i ðt 1 Þ
K 0i ðt 0 Þ

(c) If K i ðtÞ is strictly decreasing and concave,

K 0i ðt 1 Þ
K 0i ðt 0 Þ

> 0.

> 1.

K 0i ðt 1 Þ
K 0i ðt 0 Þ

> 1.

Scenario 1. There is a credit event for Greek sovereign debt:
Here ‘‘credit event’’ means any kind of debt reduction for creditors, should it be an agreed restructuring or downright default18.
This would reduce the obligatory ﬂow of funds from the Greek government (agent 4) to its creditor, notably Greek banks and their
French and German counterparts. Outside Greece, this means both
41
F 31
34 ¼ F 13;4 (payments to French banks) and F 34 ¼ F 18;4 (payments to
16
As our model fundamentally capture the dynamics of economic systems, it can be
used both to describe features and to prescribe actions that can affect their evolution.
17
The instability indicator for the Greek economy is likely to have crossed the
threshold of 1, for the ‘‘default’’ of the Greek government has spread to other agents in
the form of austerity measures, increased taxes, reduced wages for or even laying off
civil servants etc. As a result, the country plunged into a deep recession.
18
We are not concerned about CDS trigger, since the lending banks and the CDS
issuing banks are classiﬁed as a single agent B, and their cash ﬂows net out.
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German banks) would go down. This will reduce the wealth of
French and German banks, w13 and w18 , respectively, and reduced
banks’ wealth can trigger further asset price drops, for example stock
price decrease, increased withdrawals for fear of bank runs, and
increased interest rate for interbank borrowing. Mathematically
speaking, this means that for French banks,

b13;13 ¼ 1 þ a13;13 

20
X
ak;13 :

ð19Þ

k¼1
k–13

The cash ﬂows corresponding to the withdrawals by French consumers, ﬁrms, and investors, and German ﬁrms, and banks are
F 11;13 , F 12;13 ; F 15;13 ; F 17;13 ; F 18;13 , respectively, and are positive. The
wealth shock Dw13 ðtÞ on French banks is negative, therefore the
elasticities a11;13 , a12;13 ; a15;13 ; a17;13 , and a18;13 are negative. French
banks will pay less tax to the French government due to reduced
wealth, hence DF 14;13 < 0 and subsequently a14;13 > 0. This tax saving, however, will be much smaller than the panic-driven withdrawals. French banks are not directly related with other agents,
for example to Greek and Italian consumers or ﬁrms, hence the corresponding ﬂows of funds, F i;13 for i–11; 12; 13; 15; 17; 18 change
little as w13 ðtÞ goes down, and resulting ai;13 0. By Eqs. (35) and
13 ðtÞÞ
, and by Eq. (31),
(52) a13;13 ¼ @ðc13@KðtÞK
13 ðtÞ

a13;13 ðtÞ ¼

e K 0 ðtÞ
K 013 ðt þ 1Þ  K 013 ðtÞ  D
13
:
0
w13 ðtÞ

ð20Þ

If K 13 ðtÞ is decreasing and concave in t, i.e. K 13 ðtÞ decreases with
acceleration, then K 013 ðt þ 1Þ < K 013 ðtÞ by Result 3.3. The conversion
e K 13 ðtÞ of liquidity L13 ðtÞ to invested assets K 13 ðtÞ would be negaD
tive at the beginning since banks would liquidate their invested
assets to cope with increased withdrawals and payments for interbank lending, but there is a limit to doing so and it will level off
e K 13 0ðtÞ 0. Hence the numerator of Eq.
eventually. Therefore D
(20) is negative, and the denominator w013 ðtÞ is negative by our
assumption, so a13;13 ðtÞ > 0.
If the economic situation in the Eurozone has so deteriorated as
to induce a sovereign credit event, it is highly probable that many
other agents’ wealth has been declining, hence by Result 3.3 bii > 0.
Thus in Eq. (18), the hikes of b13;13 and b14;14 contribute to the rise
P20
1
of 20
i¼1 bii , a lower bound of qðBðtÞÞ. The instability indicator
ð1Þ
qðB ðtÞÞ is likely to have gone above 1 before the credit event,
i.e. it already experienced a domestic ﬁnancial crisis, and if the global instability indicator qðBðtÞÞ goes above 1, then by the deﬁnition,
a contagion of instability has taken place in the mini Eurozone, and
the cause is a credit event.
The Fed and the US government stepped in and bailed out banks
when Lehman Brothers bankrupted and other banks were having
severe liquidity shortage, which mathematically means lowering
P
b33 , hence the lower bound 15 5i¼1 bii .19 Note that the ECB lending
to European banks already sharply increased (The Financial Times,
2011) and European banks had already been borrowing dollars from
central banks (Wall Street Journal, 2011). This probably would also
happen if a Greek credit events takes place.
Scenario 2. Fear factor:
We have witnessed that, independently, markets lose conﬁdence in sovereign bonds whose yields take turns to rise to unsustainable levels (Trading Economics). In this case is not caused by
risk transmission from one subsystem to another but by the ‘‘fear
factor,’’ i.e. by investors’ loss of conﬁdence in the sovereign bond
market. This ‘‘over-reaction’’ is reﬂected by the distorted probability by a weighting function WðtÞ from Section 2.2. We use a simple
example to explain such a loss of conﬁdence. (see Tables 1–4)
19
Here we consider only the single US economy and agent 3 represents the US
banks.

406

G. Castellacci, Y. Choi / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 400–410

Table 1
Selected at-will cash ﬂows among ﬁve agents in subeconomy i.
Fund type
Equity
investment

From

To

Activities

i

C

i

Trade houses and other goods

i

i

C

F
Gi, Ii

F
Fi, Bi

Invest into each other
Invest in corporate and bank stocks

Bi

Ci

Ii

Fi
Bi
Fi, Bi, Gi

Mortgages, credit cards, other
ﬁnancing
Bank loans to companies
Interbank lending, securitization
Invest in bonds

Dividends

Fi, Bi
Ii

Ii
Ci

Pay dividends on their stocks
Pay dividends and pensions

Consumption

Ci

Fi

Consumes goods and services

Debt investment

Example 2. Consider an uncertain economy consisting of 9 states
of the world, X :¼ fx1 ; . . . ; x9 g. We identify these states with the
possible percentage returns on an investment as follows:
xi ¼ 100% þ i25%. Further, consider three probabilities on
X; P1 ; P2 , and P 3 , which represent optimism, pessimism, and norisk taking, respectively. We assume that an investor chooses one
of the three probabilities at a time while keeping the same utility
function all the time. The weighting function is the identity
function, hence the traditional utility function and the subjective
utility we adopt for this article are the same. We lay out the
numerical details in Table 5.
The subjective utilities expected utilities E1 ½UðRÞ, E2 ½UðRÞ, and
E3 ½UðRÞ under the probabilities P 1 , P 2 , and P3 are respectively:

Table 2
Selected scheduled cash ﬂows among ﬁve agents in subeconomy i.
Fund type

From

To

i

Activities

i

Coupons

C
Bi
Fi
Gi

B
Bi, Ii
Bi, Ii
Bi, Ii

Mortgages, other loan payments
Securitized debt, CDS premiums
Coupons to bond holders
Coupons to sovereign bond holders

Salary

Fi, Bi, Gi

Ci

Wages and beneﬁts

Ii

Contribution to retirement fund

i

Contributions

C

This includes the minimum credit card payment.

Table 3
Examples of contingent cash ﬂows in subeconomy i. Although MA (monetary
authorities) is not an agent, it plays an active role during a time of emergency, thus
included in the table.
Fund type

From

To

Activities

Quantitative easing
Derivative payoff

MA
Bi

Gi
Bi, Ii

Purchase sovereign bond
CDS payout

If Italian B (agent 8) and I (agent 10) lose conﬁdence in Italian
sovereign debt:

– NSU23; t F 243 ðtÞ decreases ) F 243 ¼ F 98 decreases

– NSU25; t F 245 ðtÞ decreases ) F 245 ¼ F 9;10 decreases
If French B (agent 13) loses conﬁdence in Italian sovereign debt:

23
–NSU33; t F 23
43 ðtÞ decreases ) F 43 ¼ F 9;13 decreases

1
1 1 5 1 3 2 27 3 30 2 31 1
282
E1 ½UðRÞ ¼ 0  0 þ 0  þ 0  þ  þ  þ  þ  þ  þ  1 ¼
¼ 0:88125:
4
2 10 8 10 4 10 32 10 32 10 32 10
320
1 1 2 1 3 5 2 3 1 27 1 30
31
200
E2 ½UðRÞ ¼ 0  0 þ  þ  þ  þ  þ  þ  þ 0  þ 0  1 ¼
¼ 0:640625:
10 4 10 2 10 8 10 4 10 32 10 32
32
320
3
E3 ½UðRÞ ¼ 1  ¼ 0:75:
4
If German B loses conﬁdence in Italian sovereign debt:
Therefore an investor would invest when he feels optimistic about
the market return, but hold the money when feels pessimistic. The
choice of probability could be purely psychological and independent of the actual market performance.
Suppose the Greek government (agent 4) was eventually bailed
out by international monetary authorities and the loans from
French and German banks (agent 13 and 18, respectively) have
been restructured, and the market fears that the Italian government (agent 9) may have difﬁculty in paying back its loans due
to various domestic problems, although it currently is not going
through any macroeconomic change. We further assume that this
fear has increased the Italian bond yield to an unsustainable level,
and the Italian government cannot reﬁnance its loan at an affordable rate.20
Mathematically this means that the net subjective utility
of the Italian sovereign bond investors has decreased, more
precisely:
20
In reality, when the government bond yield of Spain and Italy rose to an
unsustainable level, the ECB President Mario Draghi pledged that the ECB was ready
to do ‘‘whatever it takes’’ to preserve the Euro (The Financial Times, 2012). After this
announcement the market calmed down and the Spanish and Italian yields went back
to a sustainable level.

–NSU43;

t


24
F 24
43 ðtÞ decreases ) F 43 ¼ F 9;18 decreases

By Eq. (36) the wealth w9 of the Italian government is given by

w9 ðt þ 1Þ ¼ w9 ðtÞ ¼

20
20
X
X
F 9;j ðtÞ 
F k;9 ðtÞ;
j¼1

ð21Þ

k¼1
k–9

and reduced F 98 ; F 9;10 ; F 9;13 , and F 9;18 imply reduced wealth w9 ðtÞ.
High government bond yield implies higher domestic interest rates,
so Italian consumers and ﬁrms (agent 6 and 7, respectively) have to
pay higher interest on their loans. This means lower consumption
and productivity, and eventually a lower tax revenue to the government which is represented by reduced F 96 ðtÞ and F 97 ðtÞ in Eq. (21)21,
hence Dw9 ðtÞ < 0. On the other hand, the Italian government’s payment to the bond holders increase due to higher yield, hence ak;9 < 0
for k ¼ 8; 10; 13; 18. Very likely the Italian economy would continue
declining amid high cost of borrowing for all agents, which would
result in mass unemployment and bankruptcies. The government’s
beneﬁt payment to consumers and ﬁrms would increase while its
21
The events happen progressively and we use t for general time without specifying
the exact time of the event.
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Table 4
Samples of international ﬂow of funds between subeconomies i and j.
Fund type

From

To

Activities

Debt investment

B

i

j

B
Gj

Interbank lending
Purchase sovereign bond

Coupons

Bi
Gi

Bj
Bj

Coupons to bond holders
Coupons to sovereign bond holders

Table 5
Utility and probabilities for return x.
x

1

0.75

0.5

0.25

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

UðxÞ

0

1
4

1
2

3
4
1
10
2
10

27
32
2
10
1
10

30
32
3
10
1
10

31
32
2
10

1
1
10

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

P1

0

0

0

P2

0

1
10

2
10

5
8
1
10
3
10

P3

0

0

0

0

own wealth has decreased. This means aki < 0 for i ¼ 9 and k ¼ 6; 7.
The diagonal element b99 is formulated as

b99 ¼ 1 þ a99 

20
20
X
X
ak;9 ¼ 1 þ a99 
ak;9
i¼1
i–9
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effect in the sense described above. In terms of instability contagion, this is for the global economy to stay in state (ii) while the
global contagion never takes place.
A major advantage of the quantitative deﬁnition of contagion is
that it can be applied to partitions of subeconomies, should it be
domestic or international. Hence we can concentrate on the origin
and path of a ﬁnancial instability contagion without accessing the
entire data set of the involved countries. For example, we can partition the (mini) Eurozone into Greek government – French banks –
German banks, French consumers – French ﬁrms, German consumers – German ﬁrms etc. to investigate the contagion from the Greek
government to French/German banking sector, then from respective French banking sector to French real economy and German
banking sector to German real sector. ‘‘Local’’ data for this analysis
are far easier to obtain, for example from the central banks of each
country, the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank, than
building the entire global matrices AðtÞ and BðtÞ, which will be very
difﬁcult if not impossible, even for the mini Eurozone, due to data
availability and frequency. Using real life data to calibrate and
validate our instability contagion model is the goal of the next
project.
4. Conclusion

ð22Þ

i¼1
i–14

and ak;9 0 for 1 6 k 6 5 since there is hardly any payment obligation from the Italian government to the Greek agents. Same is true
for 11 6 k 6 20; k–13; 18, which represents obliged payment by the
Italian government to the French and German agents except for
banks. The wealth w9 ðtÞ is likely to have declined, hence b99 > 0
by Result 1, and is very likely to be big due to the magnitude of
20
P
ak;14 . Also by the same Result, it is very possible that for all other
i¼1
i–9

agents in Italy, bii > 0 and possibly bigger, hence qðBð2Þ ðtÞ > 1. If the
global indicator qððBÞÞ is still less than 1, the global economy is
Stage (ii) in the deﬁnition of the instability contagion. If the Italian
government cannot afford the high cost of borrowing yet cannot be
bailed out by monetary authorities due to the size of its economy,
hence defaults on some of its payments to French and German
banks, then as seen in Scenario 1, b13;13 and b18;18 would rise, this
time even more than the Greek credit event case, due to the size
of the Italian economy. Then qððBÞÞ could become greater than 1,
and by deﬁnition, there has been a contagion of instability from
Italy to the global economy and the cause of the local instability
is a fear factor.
We have examined the two most common – or most worried
about – causes of a cross-border instability contagion for a
scaled-down Eurozone. This approach can be applied other subsets
of the Eurozone or other monetary unions. Care should be taken,
however. Our deﬁnition of ‘‘contagion’’ should be distinguished
from ‘‘domino effect,’’ which could be used to describe a situation
where subeconomies become unstable in turns, and the chain of
instability is linked by causation.
Scenario 3. Domino Effect
We revisit the 4-subeconomy mini Eurozone from Scenarios 1
and 2. Assume that the Greek economy becomes unstable at t 1 ,
hence qðBð1Þ ðt 1 ÞÞ > 1. The Greek government eventually defaults
on its loans to the French banks, and as a result the Greek economy
stabilizes and in turn, the French economy becomes unstable, i.e.
qðBð1Þ ðt2 ÞÞ < 1 and qðBð3Þ ðt2 ÞÞ > 1 for some t2 > t1 . Then Italian
economy, having been affected by the French instability, becomes
unstable while France has managed to stabilize its economy, hence
qðBð2Þ ðt3 ÞÞ > 1 and qðBð3Þ ðt3 ÞÞ < 1 for some t3 > t2 . This is a domino

The recently developed (Castellacci and Choi, 2013) concept of
instability contagion is applied in this article to model the Eurozone sovereign credit crisis. This deﬁnition of contagion crucially
relies on the market instability indicator applied to several subsystems of a global economic system consisting of judiciously selected
agents. Given that the instability indicator is the spectral radius of
Jacobian matrices that correspond to the subsystems and the global system, the elasticities of ﬂows of funds between agents play
a key role in (in)stability.
In this setting it becomes apparent that the elasticities corresponding to fund ﬂow internal to a subsystem are responsible for
individual economies instability, while those corresponding to
fund ﬂows between agents in different subsystems may cause global instability, hence contagion. We illustrate this mechanism with
several scenarios that describe possible developments in the still
ongoing Eurozone crisis. This investigation emphasizes the interconnected structure of the economies within and without the
Eurozone, tracks the routes of risk transmission, and suggests
methods that can be used to prevent the spreading of ﬁscal and
ﬁnancial distress.
Appendix A. Previous results
A.1. Dynamical system of wealth
Recently Choi and Douady (2012) proposed an multi-agent
ﬁnancial crisis model for a single economy, and Castellacci and
Choi Castellacci and Choi, 2013 extended it to multi-economy systems. This section summarizes their results and deﬁnes the notations used in this article.
We consider a collection of s economies such that the economy
k is divided into nk aggregates which we call ‘‘economic agent.’’ The
number of economies s and those of the agents may differ from
case to case. In our Eurozone example in Section 3.3, s ¼ 4 and
nk ¼ 5 for all 1 6 k 6 4. At each time t, we observe
wðtÞ ¼ ðw1 ðtÞ; . . . ; wn ðtÞÞ 2 Rn , the global wealth vector of the
P
agents, where n ¼ sk¼1 nk . Each wðtÞ is a canonical embedding
of
the
wealth
vector
of
the
respective
economy,

k
k
k
k
k
w ðtÞ ¼ w1 ðtÞ; w2 ðtÞ; . . . ; wnk ðtÞ . Therefore wi ðtÞ ¼ wj ðtÞ if
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i ¼ NðkÞ þ j;

NðkÞ ¼

k1
X

nl :

ð23Þ

DLi ðt þ 1Þ ¼

n
n
X
X
e K i ðt þ 1Þ
F ij ðtÞ 
F ki ðtÞ  D
j–i

l¼1

The global wealth SðwðtÞÞ is the sum of all wealths:

where F ij ðtÞ is the fund transferred from agent j to agent i at time t.

n
X
SðwðtÞÞ ¼
wi ðtÞ

ð24Þ

i¼1

P
where n ¼ sk¼1 nk .
Two assumptions on the economy are made:
Minimality A minimum number of agents are selected for the
economy to function such that any removal of an agent would
make the system collapse. Mathematically, this means that there
is a minimum weight22 c > 0 of each agent in the overall economy
so that wi ðtÞ=SðwðtÞÞ P c; 8i.
Boundedness The economy is based on limited resources and
market participants, therefore the production, consumption, and
the total wealth of the economy is bounded above and below. Mathematically, this means that there is time adjustment factor 23 aðtÞ,
some C 0 ; C > 0 such that C 0 6 SðwðtÞÞaðtÞ1 6 C. Hence the normalized

¼ aðtÞ1 wðtÞ stays inside a compact and convex
wealth vector wðtÞ
subset of Rn ,

(
M¼

 2 Rn jC 0 6
w

n
X
 i 6 C;
w

)
 i P c C0
w

8 i ¼ 1; . . . ; n

ð25Þ

i¼1

During normal (i.e. non-crisis) times, we can assume that the
e Ki; D
e Di , and DLi are continuous,
rates ri ðtÞ; ci ðtÞ, and the residuals D
hence Li ðtÞ; K i ðtÞ, and Di ðtÞ are processes with continuous sample
paths, and Eqs. (30)–(32) are discrete observations of them.
For each agent i, deﬁne its state at time t as the triplet

X i ðtÞ ¼ ðLi ðtÞ; K i ðtÞ; Di ðtÞÞ 2 R3 ;

The internal return ci ðtÞK i ðtÞ of the invested asset K i ðtÞ can be
interpreted as a result of ‘‘self-investment,’’ hence replaced by

wi ðtÞ ¼ Ei ðtÞ þ Di ðtÞ

From Eq. 27, (31)–(33), and 35

and also the sum of liquidities Li ðtÞ (equivalent to the monetary
base, M0 in the case of the U.S.) and invested assets K i ðtÞ (the rest
– ﬁnancial securities, property, human resources etc.),

ð27Þ

As a result, wi ðtÞ for each i inherits the equity-debt wealth decomposition of wkj ðtÞ such that

wi ðtÞ ¼ Ei ðtÞ þ Di ðtÞ ¼ Ekj ðtÞ þ Dkj ðtÞ

ð28Þ

and the liquidity-invested asset decomposition

wi ðtÞ ¼ Li ðtÞ þ K i ðtÞ ¼ Lkj ðtÞ þ K kj ðtÞ

wi ðt þ 1Þ ¼ wi ðtÞ þ

ð35Þ

n
n
X
X
F ij ðtÞ 
F ki ðtÞ
j¼1

ð36Þ

k–i

The ﬂow of funds F ji ðtÞ from i to j at t can be considered as an investment by agent i. We assume that it affects only the counterpart j and
induces a stream of returns F ij ðsÞ at dates s > t, and each agent
‘‘invests’’ to maximize the utility (value, beneﬁt) of receiving F ij ðsÞ
for all s > t subject to liquidity and solvency constraints. This optimization is formulated by Eqs. (6)–(9). The optimal solution F ji ðtÞ of
the NLP leads to a random dynamical system f in R3n :

ð29Þ

The liquidities Li ðtÞ produce no income, while K i ðtÞ can produce
capital gains. It is assumed that during the time period ½t; t þ 1Þ,
only K i ðtÞ has an internal (i.e. independent of incoming or outgoing
cash ﬂows) growth that is measured by the internal rate of return
(IRR) ci ðtÞ on the investment.
The Di ðtÞ; K i ðtÞ and Li ðtÞ evolve as follows:24

e Di ðt þ 1Þ
Di ðt þ 1Þ ¼ ð1 þ ri ðtÞÞDi ðtÞ þ D
e K i ðt þ 1Þ
K i ðt þ 1Þ ¼ ð1 þ c ðtÞÞK i ðtÞ þ D

ð31Þ

Li ðt þ 1Þ ¼ Li ðtÞ þ DLi ðt þ 1Þ

ð32Þ

i

ð34Þ

Li ðtÞ P 0: any negative liquidity (shortage of money) is immediately converted to a debt increase .
e K i ðt þ 1Þj 6 ji ðtÞK i ðtÞ: liquidation of K i ðtÞ is limited to a fracjD
tion ji ðtÞ.
Di ðtÞ 6 Di max ðtÞ: each agent i has a maximum level of debt
Di max ðtÞ which depends on its wealth wi ðtÞ and credit market
condition.

F ii ðtÞ ¼ ci ðtÞK i ðtÞ

ð26Þ

X ¼ ðX 1 ; X 2 ; . . . ; X n Þ

It is further assumed that:

The wealth wi ðtÞ of the agent i at t is deﬁned to be the sum of the
equity and debt,

wi ðtÞ ¼ Li ðtÞ þ K i ðtÞ

ð33Þ

k–i

ð30Þ

where
e Di ðt þ 1Þ is equal to new loans less payments.
D
ri ðtÞ is the average interest that applies to the debt Di t.
e K i ðt þ 1Þ is equal to new investments less liquidation (i.e., conD
verting part of K i ðtÞ to cash).

22
Note that wi ðtÞ=SðwðtÞÞ represent the relative wealth or ‘‘weight’’ of the i-th agent
with respect to total wealth.
23
This can be thought of as a deﬂator.
24
e denotes a contribution that is different from the ordinary timeThe notation D
increments, e.g., DDi ðt þ 1Þ ¼ Di ðt þ 1Þ  Di ðtÞ.

X  ðt þ 1Þ ¼ f ðX  ðtÞÞ

ð37Þ

where the components of X  ðt þ 1Þ are given by Eqs. (30)–(32) and
(36) with optimal F ji ðtÞ, then optimal debt and wealth allocation,
under the constraints (7)–(9). From this random f, we can derive a
deterministic dynamical system f 25 that acts on rescaled state
XðtÞ ¼ aðtÞ1 XðtÞ, and from the Jacobian df of f , a reduced Jacobian
BðtÞ which is in fact the Jacobian matrix of dynamical system of

rescaled wealth wðtÞ,
i.e.


 þ 1Þ:
¼ wðt
BðtÞ ¼ d/ðtÞ; /ðwðtÞÞ

ð38Þ

The construction of f and BðtÞ above are described in detail in
Appendix of (Choi and Douady, 2012). In Castellacci and Choi,
2013 a deterministic wealth dynamical system f 26 was constructed
by observing historical ﬂow of funds, and both discrete and continuous cases were covered.

For notational simplicity, we remove ‘‘bar’’ from f and wðtÞ
and
write f and wðtÞ in the rest of the Appendices as well as in the main
body the paper. We also dropped the  symbol of the optimal
solution of the NLP to write Xðt þ 1Þ ¼ f ðXðtÞÞ etc.
25
In general we obtain a predictable process, yet when it is further assumed that
there is no exogenous random contribution, the predictable process becomes
deterministic.
26
The article used notation f for the map that corresponds to / in Eq. (38).
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Therefore

8
F kl
ðtþDtÞF kl
ðtÞ
ij
ij
klþ
>
>
> aij ðtÞ ¼ Dwlim
Dwlj
l !0þ
<
j

ð46Þ

F kl
ðtþDtÞF kl
ðtÞ
>
ij
ij
kl
>
>
: aij ðtÞ ¼ lim
D wl

l

Dwj !0

Fig. 5. When the wealth wj ðtÞ falls below the target wealth wj;0 ðtÞ, the ﬂow of funds
F ij ðtÞ decreases, but it stays ﬂat when wj ðtÞ > wj;0 ðtÞ.

ð39Þ

Since Castellacci and Choi, 2013 already showed how the dynamical
system of wealth could be constructed to be differentiable modulo
isolated points, we use the partial derivative notation throughout
the paper. 27 However care should be taken before writing

aij ¼

@F ij
;
@wj

ð40Þ

for this deﬁnition assumes the existence of the partial derivative for
both signs of the wealth shock dwj . In reality, we can observe discontinuities of elasticity coefﬁcients. For example, when major US
banks were bailed out during the 2008 US ﬁnancial crisis, the lendings to consumers and ﬁrms did not increase as much as the policy
makers expected, for the banks hoarded cash instead of lending.
Fig. 5 explains such a phenomenon.
To resolve this problem, we reﬁne the deﬁnition of elasticity
coefﬁcient as follows:

8
F ij ðtþDtÞF ij ðtÞ
þ
>
>
Dwj
< aij ðtÞ ¼ Dwlim
!0þ
j

F ij ðtþDtÞF ij ðtÞ
>

>
: aij ðtÞ ¼ Dwlim
Dwj
!0

ð41Þ

j

where wðt þ DtÞ ¼ wj ðtÞ þ Dwj .
In case the subeconomies involved in the cash ﬂows need to be
speciﬁed, we use the upper indices to denote them, so the cash
ﬂow from agent j to i in subeconomy k is

F NðkÞþi;NðkÞþj ðtÞ ¼ F kij ðtÞ

ð42Þ

We do the same thing for the Jacobian matrix and elasticity matrix:
k

bNðkÞþi;NðkÞþj ðtÞ ¼ bij ðtÞ

ð43Þ

and

aNðkÞþi;NðkÞþj ðtÞ ¼ akij ðtÞ

gðx0  uÞ  gðx0 Þ

#0

The elasticity coefﬁcient between two agents i and j is deﬁned as
the change rate of outgoing cash ﬂow with respect to the wealth of
the payer,

DF ij ðtÞ ¼ aij ðtÞDwj ðtÞ:

where wlj ðtÞ is the wealth of the j-th agent in the l-th economy at
time t and wlj ðt þ DtÞ ¼ wlj ðtÞ þ Dwlj .
More generally, it may be economically meaningful to consider
mild discontinuities along arbitrary directions. We can model this
phenomenon by introducing directional Jacobians as follows.
Recall that if u 2 Rn is a unit vector and g : Rn ! R, then we can
deﬁne the left and right directional derivatives at x0 along u as

Du;x0 ðgÞ :¼ lim

A.2. Elasticity coefﬁcient

ð44Þ



j



:

ð47Þ

We need to generalize the notion of gradient, too. The gist of the
idea is that given n linearly independent direction, we can pick a
side (left or right) for each of them and consider the corresponding
lateral directional derivative. Consider the set of n-ary multiindexes with values 1, that is the space of functions

S ¼ fs : n ! f1; 1gg ﬃ 2n

ð48Þ

where
n :¼ f1; . . . ; ng.
Given
a
base
of
directions
U ¼ fu1 ; u2 ; . . . ; un g, we deﬁne the ðU; sÞ-lateral gradient at x0 as
the vector


sð2Þ
sðnÞ
DsU;x0 ðgÞ :¼ Dsð1Þ
u1 ;x0 ðgÞ; Du2 ;x0 ðgÞ; . . . ; Dun ;x0 ðgÞ ;

ð49Þ

1

1
where we are identifying Dþ
u;x0 ðgÞ ¼ Du;x0 ðgÞ and Du;x0 ðgÞ ¼ Du;x0 ðgÞ.
Now, for any vector ﬁeld G : D ! Rm , where D Rn is open, we
deﬁne the ðU; sÞ-lateral differential or Jacobian matrix at x0 as the
matrix whose columns are the gradients of the components of G,
namely

 s

s
s
DsU;x0 ðGÞ :¼ DU;x0 ðG1 Þ DU;x0 ðG2 Þ    DU;x0 ðGm Þ ;

ð50Þ

Notice that this generalizes the customary notion of differential or
Jacobian matrix of a vector ﬁeld. Indeed, when the ﬁeld admits ﬁrst
partial derivatives at x0 , and U ¼ fe1 ; e2 ; . . . ; en g, then

DsU;x0 ðGÞ ¼ Dx0 ðGÞ;

ð51Þ

where Dx0 denotes the Jacobian at x0 . For, in this case the lateral
partial derivatives of G coincides with the partial derivatives.28
We can apply this new notion to our wealth dynamical system at
time t by taking f t ¼ G. Then we can relax the assumption that the
dynamical system admits partial derivatives everywhere to the condition that it admits directional Jacobians everywhere. Consistently
with Castellacci and Choi, 2013, we assume that the directional Jacobians may differ from the classical ones only at a set of isolated
points.
We assume that if agent j experiences a change dwj in its wealth
at time t, then the cash outﬂow from j to i is changed by aij ðtÞdwj ðtÞ,
while those from other agents are not affected. To reﬂect the internal change of wealth, ‘‘self-elasticity’’ aii of agent i is deﬁned to be

@ðF ii ðtÞÞ @ðci ðtÞK i ðtÞÞ
¼
@wi ðtÞ
@wi ðtÞ


k
where BðkÞ ðtÞ ¼ bij ðtÞ and AðkÞ ðtÞ ¼ akij ðtÞ are the Jacobian matrix

aii ðtÞ ¼

and the elasticity matrix of subeconomy k, respectively. In case two
subeconomies k and l are involved, we denote the cash ﬂow from
agent j in subeconomy l to agent i in subeconomy k by

This implies that aii dwi ¼ dF ii , hence we have aij dwj ¼ dF ij for all
1 6 i; j 6 n, including j ¼ i.
Let A ¼ ðaij Þ16i;j6n be the n  n matrix of elasticities, with entries
P
aij , and let A] be the diagonal matrix with entries a]i ¼ nk–i aki for
1 6 i 6 n,

F kl
ij ðtÞ ¼ F NðkÞþi;NðlÞþj ðtÞ:

ð45Þ

27
When the differentiability is not applicable, we modify the derivative notation to
DF
difference quotient and writeaij ¼ Dwijj .

28

If, furthermore n ¼ m, then G is locally invertible iff DsU;x0 ðGÞ is.

ð52Þ
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!

n
n
n
X
X
X
ak1 ; . . . ;
aki ; . . . ;
akn :

It was shown in (Choi and Douady, 2012 and Castellacci and Choi,
2013) that matrices A and B, regardless of the number of the
subeconomies forming the global economy, are related by the
equation:

When IðtÞ < 1 then perturbations of the system tend to be
absorbed and disappear. On the contrary, when IðtÞ > 1 then most
of the perturbations contain a component that will increasingly
propagate within the system, either as a propagation of contraction
of payments, or simply as an increase of leverage making liquidity
constraints tighter and tighter and reactions to variations of
income stronger and stronger.

B ¼ I þ A  A] ;
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As a result, both the local elasticity matrices A ðtÞ and the local
Jacobian matrices BðkÞ ðtÞ can be canonically embedded into the
global counterparts, hence at given time t,
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A.3. Market instability indicator
The ‘‘market instability indicator’’ q is deﬁned as the spectral
radius of the reduced Jacobian matrix BðtÞ.

IðtÞ ¼ qðBðtÞ

ð59Þ

The higher the indicator, the more unstable the market. In stable
e is an attractor, and the
market conditions, an equilibrium point X
e
e
eigenvalues of B ¼ Bð X Þ have modulus less than 1. when the market
is close enough to the equilibrium and, as a consequence, in its
basin of attraction, the instability indicator IðtÞ is also below the
critical value 1.
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